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Abstract—Simple non-interference is too restrictive for speci-
fying and enforcing information flow policies in most programs.
Exceptions to non-interference are provided using declassification
policies. Several approaches for enforcing declassification have
been proposed in the literature. In most of these approaches,
the declassification policies are embedded in the program itself
or heavily tied to the variables in the program being analyzed,
thereby providing little separation between the code and the
policy. Consequently, the previous approaches essentially require
that the code be trusted, since to trust that the correct policy is
being enforced, we need to trust the source code.
In this paper, we propose a novel framework in which
declassification policies are related to the source code being
analyzed via its I/O channels. The framework supports many
of the of declassification policies identified in the literature.
Based on flow-based static analysis, it represents a first step
towards a new approach that can be applied to untrusted and
legacy source code to automatically verify that the analyzed
program complies with the specified declassification policies. The
analysis works by constructing a conservative approximation of
expressions over input channel values that could be output by
the program, and by determining whether all such expressions
satisfy the declassification requirements stated in the policy. We
introduce a representation of such expressions that resembles
tree automata. We prove that if a program is considered safe
according to our analysis then it satisfies a property we call
Policy Controlled Release, which formalizes information-flow
correctness according to our notion of declassification policy. We
demonstrate, through examples, that our approach works for
several interesting and useful declassification policies, including
one involving declassification of the average of several confidential
values.
Index Terms—Security; Languages; Software verification and
validation; Data flow analysis;
I. INTRODUCTION
Programs dealing with sensitive data must prevent confiden-
tial information from flowing to unauthorized entities [1]. The
classical security property of programs, non-interference [2],
requires that publicly observable behavior is entirely indepen-
dent of secret, secure input values. Type-based [3], [4], [5] and
dataflow-based [6], [7], [8], [9] approaches have been proposed
to statically analyze whether a given program enforces non-
interference. In both approaches, each program variable is
labeled with a security level (e.g., high for secret or low
for public, though any lattice of labels can be supported). In
type-based approaches, typing rules are defined such that if
the program type-checks, the program is non-interferent. In
dataflow-based approaches, an analysis calculates dependence
relationships between program variables; non-interference is
ensured if low variables are independent from high variables.
In general, non-interference is excessively restrictive: many
programs that meet their security objectives fail to satisfy
it. A classical example of this is that of a company policy
that requires individual employee salaries be kept secret,
but allows the average salary to be disclosed. Since non-
interference prohibits any direct or indirect flow of secret
information to a public output channel, any program that
publishes the average salary violates it. To mitigate the rigidity
of non-interference, one can explicitly allow exceptions to it
in the form of declassification policies (see e.g., [10]), which
identify circumstances under which information that depends
on high-security inputs is permitted to flow to low outputs.
In type-based approaches, the exceptions to the standard
flow are usually associated with specific points in the code.
The programmer can specify the declassification policy by
using a special declass command, which usually releases the
information conditionally, depending on the value of a given
expression over program variables. In frameworks of this
kind, declassification policies are specified in a manner that is
intimately tied to the program itself.
A serious drawback of this approach is that only someone
with a deep understanding of the program can reliably write
declassification policies for it. Everyone else is forced to trust
blindly that the policies meet the required security objectives.
When code is written by trusted programmers, this assumption
may be acceptable, though even then it would be preferable
to separate concerns and make the specification, maintenance,
and review of declassification policies independent from the
program. In the case of untrusted code, this arrangement
is clearly unacceptable. Operators of systems that rely on
such a program obtain little assurance that the declassifica-
tion policies defined in it are appropriate. As pointed out
by Zdancewic [11], one of the reasons why language-based
techniques have not yet been widely adopted is that the
enforcement approaches require the programmer to worry not
only about the correctness of the program logic, but also about
how to annotate the program so that it can be deemed secure.
This state of affairs implies that declassification poli-
cies cannot readily be applied to legacy code. Unless the
legacy program satisfies strict non-interference—which, is
uncommon—the only way to determine whether such pro-
grams satisfy information-flow objectives is through the la-
borious process of understanding the program well enough to
design a program-specific declassification policy.
Recently, Banerjee et al. [12] have partly addressed the
problem of separation of concerns. They introduce a form of
declassification policies called flowspecs, which are specified
separately from the program and instantiated at particular pro-
gram points. Flowspecs are a combination of ordinary program
assertions extended with agreement predicates, both of which
refer to local and global program variables. Although, this
approach goes a long way toward separating the policy from
the code, the policies still require an intimate knowledge of the
program variables. As a result, program assertions are heavily
tied to the programs being analyzed. Additionally, since their
analysis uses the flow-insensitive, type-based approach, they
require that programs disallow assigning new values to high
variables prior to their use in expressions to be declassified.
This means that programs need to be written in a policy-
specific manner for them to be deemed valid, which is at odds
with the application of their approach to legacy code.
To stress this point further, Hicks, et al. [13] conclude that
although Jif is the most advanced security typed program-
ming language, it is not ready for mainstream use because
it requires considerably more programmer effort to write a
working program than in a conventional language. In light of
this observation, we believe there is need for an information
flow analysis framework that does not require programmer
annotations and which considers programs and policies as
independent entities. This would result in greatly reducing the
effort required to program an application.
Contribution: In this paper we introduce a novel ap-
proach for the specification and the (static) verification and
enforcement of declassification policies that are independent
of the code to which they are applied. The novelty of our
approach lies in the combination of the following features: (a)
it supports user-defined declassification policies, (b) code and
policy are separated and independent from each other, (c) it
allows one to analyse and apply declassification policies to
unannotated and untrusted code.
We believe that this work can be seen as a novel general
methodology within which verifiable analyses can be con-
structed that determine whether untrusted and legacy code
enforces such code-independent policies, together with a
particular application of the methodology implementing a
particular analysis for determining whether a particular graph-
based form of declassification policy is enforced by the input
program. The methodology provides a basis for further work
on even more expressive representations.
Rather than referring to particular program commands, our
policies identify (sets of) expressions over values obtained
from secret input channels; the values of these expressions are
thus identified as candidates for declassification. Our approach
to program analysis deems a program to be secure if it is able
to determine that public output values depend on secret inputs
only via expressions thus identified. Consequently, programs
can be written without awareness of the formal declassifica-
tion policies or of how the analyzer works, and no special
command is used in programs to specify declassification.
Our declassification policies use graphs to represent sets
of expressions over values obtained from input channels. This
allows us to express and to deal efficiently with declassification
policies that refer to iterative constructs such as loops (as in the
example in which the average salary may be disclosed and the
individual wages must remain secret). In present approaches,
to declassify the result of a looping program using standard
flow-based techniques, one is required to manually introduce
simplifications, which often consist of determining the fix-
points of loops. On the other hand, type-based techniques
usually rely on the programmer to identify in the code iterative
declassification expressions.
Our declassification policies represent values that are per-
mitted to be made public. Expressions that may be computed
by the program under analysis are also represented by a form
of an expression graph that incorporates representations of
variables and I/O channels, and captures the dependencies
(control and data) of output expressions on values obtained
from input channels. We augment the power of our expression
graphs to allow them to express the (non-regular) property that
values obtained from input channels are given by distinct read
operations, thus enabling our policies to require, for instance,
that an expression representing the average of input values
must refer to multiple distinct values read from the input
channel, and not multiple references to the value returned by
a single read operation. A graph matching mechanism is used
to ensure that the expressions are declassifiable per the policy.
Technically, our principal contribution is the introduction of
a form of Conditioned Gradual Release (CGR) called Policy
Controlled Release (PCR) —a more flexible security property
that replaces non-interference—and a result that shows this
property is satisfied by programs deemed valid by our anal-
ysis1. Compared to the prior definition of CGR [12], ours is
much simpler and more intuitive because it can be expressed
purely on the observable behaviour of programs rather than
needing details on program executions.
We believe that our work takes a first step in a new direction
for the information-flow field. The analysis of legacy and un-
trusted programs, along with a program-independent, policy-
based declassification mechanism represents an important step
towards bridging the gap between academic research in the
field and its widespread adoption in industry. Due to the
novelty of the approach, we build our mechanism over some
simple assumptions: we use a simple imperative toy language;
we define the matching mechanism mathematically, leaving
1While PCR is termination-sensitive, our analysis and theorem are
termination-insensitive in the sense that our analysis may deem valid a
program that leaks secret information by failing to terminate during a while
loop that is controlled by a nondeclassifiable expression.
specification and analysis of algorithms out of the scope; and
we leave some operational issues untreated (but discussed).
However, we pave the way for these assumptions to be relaxed,
towards a mechanism that will be able to analyze legacy
systems using newly created declassification policies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
presents detailed examples that illustrate our approach. In
Section III we define our language syntax and semantics, as
well as the program expression graphs and declassification
policies, and one more example. Our matching mechanism is
presented in Section IV. The security property is discussed
in Section V, and the soundness of our analysis is shown in
Section VI. Finally, Section VII presents related work, and
Section VIII contains our discussion and conclusions of this
work.
II. EXAMPLE
In this section we illustrate by means of two examples the
mechanism of our framework. The first example refers to one
of the classical situations requiring declassification: authenti-
cation and password matching. The basic security requirement
is that user information should not flow to the output channel,
with one exception (captured by the declassification policy):
boolean queries on the user’s record may be declassified. Now,
in order to authenticate the user, 3 methods are possible. If the
user’s record is “complete” and the user has a given credential,
the function validate can check this credential. This is the
preferred method for authentication. If, however, the user does
not have the required credential, but his record is complete,
then the same validate function can be applied over the user’s
last name, validating the user’s name against a list. Finally,
if the user’s record is not complete, then the system prompts
for a password, from another input channel, and use function
verify to check it along with the user login name. In the end,
the result of the authentication is sent to the output channel.
The example program is given below. The language it uses is
a standard imperative programming language, with no special
security constructs, which will be used throughout the paper.
The inputs and outputs to the program are specified using input
and output channels and represented with Greek letters, as
further explained in Section III. Channel α returns the record
with the user information, channel β is used to retrieve a
password from the user, if necessary, and channel γ is the
output channel to where authorization information is sent.
Example 1. Authentication program:
struct x := α;
string f ;
bool v;
if iscomplete(x) then
if hascred(x) then
f := credential(x);
else
f := lastname(x);
v := validate(f);
else
f := login(x);
string y := β;
v := verify(f, y);
γ := v;
Pre-processing and conversion to SSA: Our analysis
works on code that has already been pre-processed in the
following way: (1) operators are translated into functions (e.g.,
a + b becomes add(a, b)), (2) only one function is allowed
per assignment, i.e., assignments of complex expressions are
broken into several assignments, (3) conditions on control-flow
commands (if and while) refer to a single boolean variable.
We also convert a program into the Static Single Assignment
(SSA) format using standard methods [14]. SSA is a known
intermediate representation form for programs, in which every
variable is assigned exactly once. Variables being assigned
more than once are renamed (with a different name for each
assignment: typically the original name with a subscript). For
variables that are modified in the body of branching state-
ments (e.g. conditionals and loops), the translation algorithm
generates a new variable name at the join points (at the end
of the conditional or the loop). Moreover, a new function φ is
introduced, which takes as input the variable values from all
the branches, and outputs the value from the branch that was
taken. During the translation, we additionally annotate the φ
function with the conditional variable of the branch to which
the φ function is associated. The technique for computing SSA
form of a program has been proved to be tractable. For more
information on it refer to [14], [15].
Example 2. Authentication program in SSA format:
struct x1 := α;
bool c1 := iscomplete(x1);
string f0;
bool v0;
depends(β, c1);
if c1 then
c2 := hascred(x1);
if c2 then
f1 := credential(x1);
else
f2 := lastname(x1);
f3 := φc2(f1, f2);
v1 := validate(f3);
else
f4 := login(x1);
string y1 := β;
v2 := verify(f4, y1);
v3 := φc1(v1, v2);
f5 := φc1(f3, f4);
γ := v3;
Note that the conditions are syntactically associated with
the φ-functions. Also, the depends command is generated
during the pre-processing and serves the purpose of making
the control dependence between channel β and variable c1
explicit, since the input occurs inside the conditional. This
will be further explained in the next section.
Expression Graph: An expression graph is an abstraction
for representing the set of expressions that may be assigned to
a variable (or to more variables), taking into consideration the
input channels and the constants that a program refers to. In
an expression graph nodes represent variables, constants and
I/O channels, whereas directed edges represent assignments.
The labels on the edges denote the functions used in the
assignments, while the subscripts indicate the indices of the
arguments from the parent nodes. Edges of φ-functions are
dashes as they are used to represent distinct paths that infor-
mation can follow during an execution, each path separately
creating a set of expressions. The control edge illustrates
that there is a control dependency between two nodes, the
parent being the variable representing the control expression.
Figure 1 shows the expression graph g associated with the
variable v3 of our program. For clarity, a control edge between
c1 and β is omitted, since c1 also causes a control dependency
in v3, and it will be analyzed anyway.
Fig. 1. Expression graph for variable v3 of authentication program
Policy Graph: Declassification policies are also repre-
sented using graphs. In fact, a policy graph is similar to the
expression graphs associated with program variables, except
for some key differences, including: (1) nodes can be labeled
with “wildcards”, i.e., labels in the form ∗, (2) certain nodes
in the policy are marked as “final nodes” (represented by
the double lined circle), representing expressions that can
be declassified. A declassification policy consists of a graph
which might contain several disjoint components (to allow
multiple expressions to be released). The policy graph, d, for
our authentication program in Example 2 is given in Figure 2.
We know that information from either channels α and β cannot
directly flow to the channel γ, the policy of Figure 2 allows
such a flow under a few additional conditions. The following
operations are allowed: two boolean checks on the user’s
record α (if it has a credential and if is a complete record),
two validation operations over user’s information (validation
through the credential or the last name), and a verification of
the user’s login against a supplied password from channel β.
The final nodes ∗1, ∗2, ∗3, ∗5 and ∗7 represent the expressions
that can be declassified.
Fig. 2. Policy graph for example of authentication program
Policy Matching: Now that we have both the program and
the policy graph, we can check if the program is safe. In our
program the (low) output γ is assigned the value of variable v3,
so what we now have to check is that the paths in the program
graph indicating the flow of information from a high input to
v3 are safe, i.e., that they match at least one component of the
declassification policy. This analysis is done in two stages:
first all data dependencies of a node are checked, later in the
second stage the control dependencies are checked. The node
representing v3 in the graph has 3 information paths (defined
in the next sections, not the standard concept of a path in a
graph) reaching it: (a) one that comes from channel α passing
through nodes x1, f1, f3 and v1, (b) another also coming from
α, but passing through f2 instead of f1, and the final one (c)
coming from both α and β, converging on node v2. These
paths represent the three possible outcomes of the nested if
commands.
To determine that the node v3 is safe we will first analyse
its parents. First, node v2, has only information path (c)
reaching it. This path matches the leftmost component of our
declassification policy in Figure 2, and we say that node v2
simulates node ∗7, meaning that all expressions possibly held
by v2 are recognized by ∗7. Or, in other words, v2 ∼g,d ∗7.
Because of this, this path to v2 is marked as data dependency
safe, and so is the node, since this is its only path reaching it
(note that the graphs are not exactly the same, our definition
of policy simulation handles this properly). Since v2 has no
additional control dependencies (the dependency with c1 is
treated for v3), we now know it is a safe node.
With (node) v2 being safe, we now analyse v1. This node
has two information paths (a) and (b) reaching it. We can see
that, for each path, v1 simulates a final node of each of the
3-node components of the policy (∗3 and ∗5), on the bottom
of Figure 2. Thus, both paths are data dependency safe, and so
is the node itself. There is however a control dependency that
we have to consider, with c2 that reaches v1. But here node c2
simulates the final node of the topmost policy component (∗1),
thus making it safe (it has no control dependencies or other
paths) and thus making v1 control dependency safe. Therefore,
we now know that v1 is a safe node.
We can now go back to v3. Since its two parent nodes are
safe, we know that v3 is a data dependency safe node, since
all the paths were covered. In order to demonstrate it is also
control dependency safe, we need to show that node c1 is safe,
this is done by showing that the node simulates a final node
of a policy graph (∗2). Thus, v3 is a safe variable and the
program’s expression graph is deemed valid.
Second Example: We now provide a second example, that
will be referred to throughout the paper. This example involves
a policy which allows the declassification of expressions
in a given recursive pattern, represented in the code by a
looping structure. For this, this example uses control context
annotations on the edges of the program expression graphs.
These annotations were omitted on the previous example,
for clarity. This example is inspired by another classical
need for declassification: statistical calculations on secure data
(where high data should not be released but statistics on it
may be declassified). The program, given below (already pre-
processed), calculates the average of the entries in a given data
structure. Channel α returns the next element of a sequence
of salaries of an organization. The code below fetches all the
salaries from the structure, calculates their average, and then
sends the result to output channel γ.
Example 3. Average calculation program in SSA format:
int a1 := 0;
int i1 := 0;
int l1 := length(α);
bool c1 := leq(i1, l1);
while (c3 := φc3(c1, c2);
a3 := φc3(a1, a2);
i3 := φc3(i1, i2);
c3) do
int t1 := α;
a2 := add(a3, t1);
i2 := add(i3, 1);
c2 := leq(i2, l1);
a4 := div(a3, l1);
γ := a4;
Note that the φ-functions are placed along with the loop
condition and the program semantics would require that the
φ assignment be executed even if the loop is not taken, but
also once after each iteration [16]. Again, the output channel γ
receives the value of a4, so we need to prove that a4 is safe.
To do so, we produce the expression graph associated to it
(Figure 3). For the sake of clarity, Figure 3 only includes data-
dependencies of a4. Since we also have to consider the control
dependencies, and the only control dependency of a4 goes
through c3, we represent the graph associated with node c3
separately in Figure 4. The numeric annotations on the edges
indicate control contexts in which assignments are performed.
With that, the assignments that happen within the loop have
its corresponding edges marked with 1. The other edges are
part of control context 0, with their annotations omitted.
The policy graph for the average example is given in
Fig. 3. Expression graph for variable a4
Fig. 4. Expression graph for variable c3
Figure 5. This policy allows for the release of a sequence
of additions over entries from input α. The final node ∗3
represents the sum expression.
The policy contains an additional constraint that states
that no individual α-values should reach ∗3 more than once
(every access to α must be unique). Assuming d is the policy
graph, we say that (α, ∗3) ∈ uni(d). This is called an input
uniqueness relation, we discuss how to express this in the next
section.
We also assume that there is an omitted component of the
policy graph that specifies that the expression length(α) can
be declassified.
Fig. 5. Declassification policy graph for average example
This example program is deemed valid by the policy. Node
a3 simulates node ∗3 on the policy and the α-uniqueness
constraint is satisfied through the use of the control context
annotations. Variable l1 holds length(α), which is also autho-
rized as previously mentioned. This makes c3 being marked
as safe, which in turn makes a3 control dependency safe.
Therefore, a4 is marked as safe. The mechanisms used in this
process are detailed in the next sections.
It is important to note that, since our approach works as
a static analyzer, it is beyond the focus of our representation
mechanism (i.e. graphs) to represent the run-time behaviour
of the program, including the number of times a given loop
runs. This problem, however, can be treated by a combination
of static analysis and runtime enforcement, discussed in Sec-
tion VIII, but out of the scope of this paper, aimed at static
analysis only.
III. LANGUAGE: SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS
In this section we introduce the syntax and semantics of our
language, we present programs’ expression graphs and how
they are created, together with a soundness theorem. Finally,
we present the declassification policies.
Program Syntax and Semantics: Var is a set of variables,
x, y, z, c, range over Var and may have subscripts; c is usually
a boolean variable. Additional IO variables (IO = In ∪ Out)
represent input/output channels. We use α, β to denote input
channels, γ, δ to denote output channels, and θ to range over
all of IO. We additionally use ρ to range over Var+IO. Input
channels are regarded as streams of values and are indexed to
indicate specific input values; e.g., αn denotes the n-th input
value of input channel α.
Functions are defined the usual way. Constants are functions
of arity 0, and we use N to denote them. Expressions are
obtained by combining functions, variables (also IO) and
constants in the usual way.
We use a simple imperative language with assignment,
conditionals and loops, already translated to SSA form. To
simplify the presentation, we assume that all operators are
applied using prefix notation (e.g., writing add(a, b) instead
of a + b), with at most one function per assignment (no
nesting); also, expressions on conditionals refer to a single
boolean variable. Any program can be translated to this format
in a straightforward manner. Regarding the SSA translation,
φ-functions always have the form x := φc(a, b), where c is the
conditional variable that generated that φ-function. In while
expressions, C represents the φ-functions added by the SSA
translation, which are evaluated once if the loop is not taken,
and at every iteration otherwise.
Definition 4. A program C ∈ Prog is defined by the following
syntax:
C ::= skip | x := α | γ := x | x := f(y1, . . . , yk)
| x := φc(a, b) | depends(θ, c) | C1 ; C2
| if c then C1 else C2 | while C ; c do C
The command depends(θ, c) is a special command that
helps our non-standard semantics keep track of control de-
pendence on I/O channels. It is added to the program during
pre-processing: depends(θ, c) is inserted every time an input
or output operation occurs inside a conditional, and relates
the channel with the conditional under which it occurs. The
command is added just before the conditional block in which
the operation takes place.
Next, we define the program semantics, starting from the
notion of state. Note that we present an instrumented seman-
tics, in the sense that the state of the process keeps track of
certain information useful for proving the compliance of our
validation mechanism.
A state σ ∈ Σ is a 4-tuple 〈E , I ,O ,PC 〉, where
E ∈ E = Var → Exp〈In× N〉
I ∈ I = In → N
O ∈ O = Out → P(Exp〈In× N〉)
PC ∈ PC = (Var + IO)→ P(Exp〈In× N〉)
E is a mapping from variables to expressions on indexed input
channels, keeping track of the expression over the input that a
variable holds; I is a mapping from input channels to numeric
indexes, keeping track of the index of the next value to be
read (so I (α) denotes index of the next value to be read from
channel α); initially, I (α) = 1 for every input channel α. O
maps each output channel to the set of expressions (on indexed
inputs) that could be sent over that channel. Finally, PC
maps variables and channels (both input and output) to sets
of expressions on indexed inputs, which records the implicit
information flows, i.e. the expressions on which the variables
and channels are conditionally dependent. Given a state σ, we
write Eσ to indicate its first component, Iσ for the second,
etc. We omit σ if it is clear from the context, thus e.g. E (x)
denotes the expression held by x in the “current” state.
Next, we define environments which provide the input to
the program through the channels. We have a straightforward
channel model where the channels are independent of each
other. In Section VIII we discuss how to extend this to more
intricate channel models.
pi ∈ Π : In× N → Val
Finally, we define a configuration over which the semantics
are defined.
Definition 5 (Configuration). A configuration ω ∈ Ω is a
triple 〈C, σ, pi〉, where C is a program, σ a state and pi an
environment.
Note that the environment determines the inputs that have
been or will be provided to the program and (due to our
channel model) does not change during the execution of the
program. The operational semantics is presented in Figure 6.
The transitions between configurations have a label (∈ Obs)
representing what can be observed externally when that transi-
tion occurs; a τ label represents a non-observable transition. In
our case, the only observable action is the output, showing the
channel and the value being sent over the channel. I.e. o ∈ Obs
is τ or out(γ, v) for some output channel γ and value v.
We use square brackets to denote substitution e.g.
Eσ[Eσ(y)/x] returns a new Eσ′ , in which Eσ′(x) = Eσ(y).
For changes in the state, we only indicate the components
for which σ′ differs from σ. Our semantics treats φ-functions
in a special way. Unlike the standard functions, φ-functions
are evaluated as soon as they appear. Function EV makes this
evaluation. According to standard definition of the φ-functions
in SSA form, the function returns the variable that has been
defined most recently. The boldface f, used in function V
indicates that the function is actually evaluated to a value.
The initial state σ
init
is the state in which no channels
have been read yet (I (α) = 1), all variables are undefined
〈x := α, σ, pi〉
τ
−→ 〈skip, σ′, pi〉 (Input)
where Eσ′ = Eσ[αIσ(α)/x]
Iσ′ = Iσ[Iσ(α) + 1/α]
PC σ′ = PC σ[PC σ(α)/x]
〈γ := x, σ, pi〉
o
−→ 〈skip, σ′, pi〉 (Output)
where o = out(γ, V (Eσ(x), pi))
Oσ′ = Oσ[Oσ(γ) ∪ Eσ(x)/γ]
PC σ′ = PC σ[PC σ(γ) ∪ PC σ(x)/γ]
〈x := f(y1, . . . , yk), σ, pi〉
τ
−→ 〈skip, σ′, pi〉 (Assign)
where Eσ′ = Eσ[f(Eσ(y1), . . . ,Eσ(yk))/x]
PC σ′ = PC σ[PC σ(y1) ∪ . . . ∪ PC σ(yk)/x]
〈x := φc(a, b), σ, pi〉
τ
−→ 〈skip, σ′, pi〉 (Phi)
where Eσ′ = Eσ[EV (φc(a, b), σ)/x]
PC σ′ = PC σ[Eσ(c) ∪ PC σ(c) ∪ PC σ(a) ∪ PC σ(b)/x]
〈depends(θ, c), σ, pi〉
τ
−→ 〈skip, σ′, pi〉 (Depends)
where PC σ′ = PC σ[PC σ(θ) ∪ Eσ(c) ∪ PC σ(c)/θ]
〈if c then C else C, σ, pi〉
τ
−→ 〈C, σ, pi〉 if V (E (c), pi) = true (If 1)
τ
−→ 〈C, σ, pi〉 if V (E (c), pi) = false (If 2)
〈while C ; c do C, σ, pi〉
τ
−→ 〈C, σ, pi〉 if V (E (c), pi) = false (While 1)
τ
−→ 〈C ; C ; while C ; c do C, σ, pi〉
if V (E (c), pi) = true (While 2)
〈skip ; C, σ, pi〉
τ
−→ 〈C, σ, pi〉 (Skip)
〈C, σ, pi〉
o
−→ 〈C′, σ′, pi〉
〈C ; C, σ, pi〉
o
−→ 〈C′ ; C, σ′, pi〉
(Seq)
EV : Exp<Var> × Σ→ Exp<In× N>
EV (φc(a, b), σ) =
{
E (a) if a has been most recently defined;
E (b) if b has been most recently defined.
V : Exp<In× N> × Π→ Val
V (e, pi) =
{
pi(α, n) if e = αn;
f(V (e1, pi), . . . , V (en, pi)) if e = f(e1, . . . , en).
Fig. 6. Program semantics
(E (x) =⊥) and no output has been written to any channel
(O(γ) = ∅). A run of program C in environment pi is a se-
quence of configurations, starting from the initial configuration
and linked by transitions, i.e., t ∈ (Obs × Ω)∗ in which for
t = 〈o0, ω0〉.〈o1, ω1〉 . . . 〈on, ωn〉, o0 = τ , ω0 = 〈C, σinit , pi〉,
and for each i, such that 0 ≤ i < n, ωi
oi+1
−−−→ ωi+1 is
a transition given by the semantics (Figure 6). We say the
run is a full run if no steps are possible from end state ωn
otherwise the run is called a prerun. We write ι(t) for the
sequence of (visible) output actions taken in t and t1 ≡out t2
if ι(t1) = ι(t2). For sets of traces T, T ′ we put T ≡out T ′ if
∀t ∈ T : ∃t′ ∈ T ′ : t ≡out t
′ and vice versa. Finally, we also
write Run(C, pi) for the runs of C (note that for each prerun
in t there is exactly one run t′ which extends t with one step).
Program Expression Graph: Now we define how a graph
is built from the program. We consider a directed typed graph,
defined as G = (V,E) where V ⊆ Vertex and E ⊆ Edge
are the sets of vertices and edges, respectively. A vertex n
has the form (l, t), where l is the label and t is the type,
which can be var, in, out, and const, for variables,
I/O channels and constants, respectively. For convenience, nl
denotes the vertex with label l, and we assume that the type
of the node is clear from the label, e.g., nx, nα, nγ , nρ
and nN are nodes of types var, in, out, any and const,
respectively. An edge e has the form (n, n′, t, i), where n and
n′ are the origin and destination vertices, respectively; t is
the edge type, which can be plain (for assignments with
no function application), control (for control dependencies
between boolean variables in conditionals and variables as-
signed inside the conditional block), or a function name f , for
edges that represent function applications, and i is an index
that represents the control context in which the assignment
represented by the edge takes place. We use fi when the source
node of the edge is the i-th argument of function f .
To build the graph we use the function G, defined in
Figure 7, which takes a command C and two control context
indexes i and j as arguments and returns the corresponding
graph. Argument i represents the “current” control context
index, whereas j represents the highest index and it is used to
guarantee that different control contexts have distinct indexes.
We write G(C) as a short to G0,0(C). The φ-functions
generated on SSA translation are used to handle control flow
dependencies. Note that there are multiple definitions for
assignments, according to the format of the RHS operator.
Also, for the control context index, φ-functions in loops
receive a special treatment. In these cases, the function is
called and returns the first argument (φ1 edge) aways once,
regardless if the loop runs or not, whereas it is called and
returns the second argument (φ2 edge) as many times as the
loop runs. Thus, the φ1 edge is labeled with the control context
index of before entering the loop, and φ2 is labeled with
the same control context of the loop. This is represented by
function G. Also, function mcc(g) takes a graph g and returns
the highest control context index in it.
G : Prog × N× N → G
Gi,j(skip) = ∅
Gi,j(C1 ; C2) = Gi,j(C1) ∪Gi,j′ (C2)
where j′ = mcc(Gi,j(C1))
Gi,j(if c then C1 else C2) = Gj+1,j+1(C1 ; C2)
Gi,j(while C ; c do C) = Gi,j+1(C) ∪Gj+1,j+1(C)
Gi,j(x := α) = nα −→
i
nx
Gi,j(γ := x) = nx −→
i
nγ
Gi,j(x := y) = ny −→
i
nx
Gi,j(x := f(y1, . . . , yk)) = ny1
f1
−→
i
nx, . . . , nyk
fk−→
i
nx
Gi,j(x := φc(a, b)) = na
φ1
−→
i
nx, nb
φ2
−→
i
nx, nc
control
−−−−−→ nx
Gi,j(depends(θ, c)) = nc
control
−−−−−→ nθ
Gi,j(C1 ; C2) = Gi,j(C1) ∪Gi,j(C2)
Gi,j(x := φc(a, b)) = na
φ1
−→
i
nx, nb
φ2
−→
j
nx, nc
control
−−−−−→ nx
Fig. 7. Graph building function
Definition 6 (Expression Graph). The expression graph g ∈
G of a program C is given by G(C).
We use nodes(g) and edges(g) to denote the sets of vertices
and edges of g, respectively. We use n t−→
i
n′ to denote that
there is an edge of type t and control context i from node
n to node n′. When t = plain, we use just n → n′ as
a shorthand and we omit i when its value is irrelevant. In a
similar fashion, n w−→
∗
n′ denotes that there is a path between
nodes n and n′, with w being the sequence of labels on this
path, and n w−→
i
∗
n′ denotes that the whole path w has the same
control context i. We also use φ−→ to denote either φ1−→ or φ2−→.
Using a notation analogous to that of bisimulation [17], we
call an edge a τ -edge if its type is either plain or φ. Finally,
we write 6→ n to denote that the indegree of n is zero, and
function type(n) returns the type of a node n.
For our first theorem, we first present the definition of input-
uniqueness.
Definition 7 (Input Uniqueness on Expressions). An expres-
sion e : Exp〈In×N〉 is said to be α-unique if every occurrence
of α represents a distinct access on that input channel, i.e.
every αi has a distinct index i.
We now define a notion of α-uniqueness for graph nodes
n that will be used below to express the requirement that
expressions recognized by n be α-unique. Given a graph g, this
notion is represented by a set of pairs uni(g) ⊆ In × Vertex
and (α, n) ∈ uni(g) indicates that n is intended to represent
only α-unique expressions. In policy graphs (see Definition 10
below), this set is given explicitly. For program graphs, we
derive it according to the following definition. (We believe
that this definition is somewhat conservative in the sense that
it may not extract all α-uniqueness pairs that could be derived
in some cases, but it serves us well, is simple, and admits
efficient computation.)
Definition 8 (Input Uniqueness on Nodes). Let nx be a
variable node in the program expression graph g, and α be
an input channel. We say that nx is α-unique,
(α, nx) ∈ uni(g)
if each path w from nα to nx has a unique control context iw
(i.e., for each such path w there exists iw such that nα w−→
iw
∗
nx).
We now define function exp : Vertex × G → P(Exp〈In ×
N〉) which makes precise the set of expressions represented
by each graph node. We write expg(n) to denote the set of
expressions represented by node n in graph g, and we omit g
when it is clear from context. So that the following definition
can be applied to policy graphs (see Definition 10 below) as
well as to program graphs, it is defined over nodes labeled
with wildcard (n∗), as well as over nodes labeled as they are
in program graphs.
exp(nN ) = {N}
exp(n∗) = Const if type(n∗) = const
exp(nα) = {αi | i ∈ N}
exp(n∗) = In× N if type(n∗) = in
exp(nγ) =
⋃
n′→nγ
exp(n′)
exp(nx) =
Ψnx


⋃
n′
τ−→nx
exp(n′)
∪ {f(e1, . . . , ek) |
∃ni
fi
−→ nx, e
i ∈ exp(ni), i = 1..k}


Ψn(E) = {e ∈ E | ∀α ∈ In :
(α, n) ∈ uni(g)⇒ e is α-unique}
where Const denotes the set of (syntactical) constants and
Ψn is a filter used to deal with input uniqueness, removing
expressions which don’t satisfy α-uniqueness if the node n
holds that property. Note that in the above definition exactly
one of the subsets of exp(nx) will be non-empty as each node
either has a single plain edge, two φ edges or k incoming
function edges. A node of type const with a wildcard ∗
label holds any constant as its expressions and a node of type
in with wildcard label matches any indexed input αi.
We also define the function cexp : Vertex × G →
P(Exp〈In×N〉) that computes all conditional expressions the
value held by a node can depend upon.
cexp(n) = {cexp(n′) | n′
t
−→ n}∪{exp(n′′) | n′′
control
−−−−−→ n}
We can finally state our first result, which is about the
soundness of the graph translation. The proof is omitted and
is available in the technical report [18].
Theorem 9 (Soundness of the graph translation). Given a
program C0, environment pi0, let t be a run in Run(C0, pi0),
and g = G(C0). For any configuration 〈C, σ, pi〉 ∈ t we have
that σ satisfies:
(PE ) ∀x ∈ Var : E (x) is defined ⇒
(x,var) ∈ nodes(g) ∧ E (x) ∈ exp(nx)
(PI ) ∀α ∈ In : I (α) > 0⇒
(α,in) ∈ nodes(g)
(PO) ∀γ ∈ Out : O(γ) is defined ⇒
(γ,out) ∈ nodes(g) ∧O(γ) ⊆ exp(nγ)
(PPC ) ∀ρ ∈ Var + IO : PC (ρ) is defined ⇒
(ρ, type(ρ)) ∈ nodes(g) ∧ PC (ρ) ⊆ cexp(nρ)
(PE) states that each variable has a corresponding node,
and that the expression of the variable is contained in the set
of possible expressions held by that node; (PI) states that
for each input channel accessed in the process there exists a
corresponding node in the graph; (PO) states that for each
output channel there exists a corresponding node, and that the
set of expressions sent to that output in the process is a subset
of the set of possible expressions held by that node; finally,
(PPC) states that for each variable (and I/O channel), the set
of conditional expressions that the variable depends on is equal
to that set for the corresponding node.
Policy Expression Graph: Policy graphs work in the same
way as program graphs, with a few key differences: (1) one or
more nodes are marked as “final nodes”; (2) nodes can have
“wildcards” as label, in the form of ∗i, meaning that they can
match any other node, regardless of the label; (3) edges don’t
have control context labels; and (4) input uniqueness relations
are provided with the policy, working as constraints over the
recognized expressions. These differences are justified by the
fact that the program graph is calculated, in order to represent
all possible expressions that can be held by variables in the
program, whereas policy graphs are supplied, recognizing the
set of expressions that can be declassified. For clarity, we write
∗t to denote the wildcard on a node of type t, and just ∗
when t = var. The matching process between the policy and
program graph is defined in Section IV.
Definition 10 (Declassification Policy). A declassification
policy is a graph d ∈ D, with possibly disjoint components,
in the form d = (V,E, Vf , U), where V ⊆ Vertex is a set
of vertices, E ⊆ Edge is a set of edges, Vf ⊆ V is a set of
final vertices and U ⊆ In × V is a set of input uniqueness
relations.
The final vertices hold the expressions allowed to be de-
classified. Thus, the set of expressions allowed by a policy
graph is determined by
⋃
nf∈Vf
expd(nf ). Also, we use uni(d)
to return the set of input uniqueness relations from a policy d.
Thus, for our working example of the average salary, we have
that the policy of Figure 5 recognizes the set of expressions
{0, add(0, αi), add(add(0, αi), αj), . . .}, with all indices on α
being distinct, as (α, ∗3) ∈ uni(d). It is important to point that
this work addresses the problem of enforcing declassification
policies, rather than specifying them. However, it is fairly
straightforward to derive a rule that translates the policy graph
to/from some form of regular expressions (e.g. regular tree
expressions).
We now present another example, showing the use of
wildcards in the policy. It is another of the classical examples
of declassification, this time in presence of encryption: we
have data that is sensitive if unencrypted, but its encrypted
version can be declassified. The code below is already pre-
processed: the input channel α provides a sensitive plain
text file, β represents a cryptographic key. Output channel γ
represents a low output.
Example 11. Encryption program:
text x1 := α;
int k1 := β;
x2 := enc(x1, k1);
γ := x2;
For our example, we consider a policy that allows any input
to be declassified, as long as it is encrypted with a specific
key, using a specific function. Figure 8 shows the graphs for
both the policy and the program. In this case, node ∗in2 in
the policy matches node α in the graph, and it is clear that
the content of variable x2 can be made public, matching final
node ∗1.
As mentioned in our first example, we don’t consider a
declassification to be invertible. For this example, one may
think that, after x2 has been marked as safe, a decryption
function could be used to retrieve the original α value to
Fig. 8. Encryption program and its matching policy
a new x3 variable. However, since the decryption function
would need the decryption key, the inheritance from x2 by
itself would not be sufficient for x3 to be marked as safe. The
edge from input β to the decryption function would also need
to be validated and this validation would not happen, as there
is no policy that allows it, therefore making x3 insecure.
IV. POLICY MATCHING
Having defined the expression graphs of program and policy
in the previous section we now introduce the mechanism
that matches them. This will allow us to define which nodes
are safe according to the policy. If all output nodes are
safe, then the program represented by the graph is safe too.
Note that multiple disjoint components of a declassification
graph may be needed to show the safety of a program. To
simplify this process we first extract the sub-graphs from the
program’s expression graph that could be validated separately
(called information paths). Next we carry out the matching
between an information path and a (single) component on
a policy graph. It is important to point that in this section
we present the definition of the matching mechanism, rather
than an algorithm. Even though an algorithm can be directly
derived from our definitions, due to space constraints we leave
specification and analysis of such algorithm as future work.
An information path captures one way that expressions can
flow into a node starting from input channels and constants.
Multiple function edges to a same node represent the same
expression held by that node, and all edges need to be included
in the path. On the other hand, φ-edges represent points where
control flow may branch, and therefore each φ-edge represents
a distinct information path. Note that an information path may
still have multiple incoming τ -edges because loops may cause
us to reach the same node multiple times. We represent an
information path by the set of edges it contains (the set of
vertices for the graph can be obtained by collecting the source
or destination of the edges). For a set S of information paths
we use the notation:
S ⊕ e = {g ∪ {e} | g ∈ S}
S ⊗ S′ = {g ∪ g′ | g ∈ S, g′ ∈ S′}
The function ip calculates all the information paths that
reach node n, which is the set of sub-graphs satisfying:
ip(n) = {∅} if 6→ n. Otherwise:
ip(n) =
⋃
n′
τ−→n
ip(n′)⊕ (n′, n, t) ∪
⊗
n′
fi−→n
ip(n′)⊕ (n′, n, t)
If one information path is a sub-graph of another then
validating the larger graph also validates the smaller so we
only need to consider maximal information paths, i.e. maximal
elements of ip.
mip(n) = {g | g ∈ ip(n),∀g′ ∈ ip(n) : g 6⊂ g′}
The next step is to relate the maximal information paths to
the policies. This is done by the notion of policy simulation
which is a “bundled” weak simulation. We write (ni)i=1..k
f
⇒
n′ if ∃n : ∀i ∈ {1..k} : ni ( τ−→)∗ fi−→ ( τ−→)∗ n′. Also we
call two nodes similar n ≃ n′ if they have the same type and
either the labels are the same or one of them is a wildcard ∗.
Definition 12 (Policy Simulation). A relation R between
information path nodes and policy graph nodes is called a
policy simulation if for all (n, nd) ∈ R we have:
n ≃ nd ∧
(n′
τ
−→ n ⇒ ∃n′d : n
′
d (
τ
−→)∗ nd ∧ (n
′, n′d) ∈ R) ∧
(∀i ∈ {1..k} : ni
fi
−→ n ⇒ ∃n1d..n
k
d : (n
i
d)i=1..k
f
⇒ nd ∧
∀i ∈ {1..k} : (ni, nid) ∈ R) ∧
(∀(α, nd) ∈ uni(d),∀w : nα
w
−→
∗
n⇒ ∃i : nα
w
−→
i
∗
n)
We use ∼g,d to denote the largest policy simulation (i.e. the
union of all of them) between information path g and policy
graph d.
Next, we present a few supporting definitions for validating
a program’s expression graph. First, we define when a node
n in an information path g is “safe” in terms of data depen-
dencies. This is the case if it matches some final node of the
declassification policy or all its parents are already safe; here
fnodes(d) returns the sets of final vertices on policy graph d.
ddsg(n, d) ≡ (∃nf ∈ fnodes(d) : n ∼g,d nf ) ∨
(∀(α,in) ∈ nodes(g), w : α w−→
∗
n
⇒ ∃n′ ∈ nodes(g) : α
w′
−→
∗
n′
w′′
−−→
∗
n ∧
ddsg(n
′, d))
Now we define a data dependency safe node, as a node
in which all maximal information paths that reach it are data
dependency safe. Function dds defines this relation.
dds(n, g, d) ≡ ∀p ∈ mip(n, g) : ddsp(n, d)
Similarly, a node is “control dependency safe” (CDS) if
all nodes on which it has control dependencies, directly or
indirectly, are DDS. For this definition, the whole graph
is analyzed, instead of only individual paths. Relation cds
captures the notion.
cds(n, g, d) ≡ ∀n′ ∈ nodes(g) : ∃n′′ ∈ nodes(g) :
n′
control
−−−−−→ n′′
w
−→
∗
n⇒ dds(n′, g, d)
Then, a “safe” node is a node whose both data and control
dependencies are safe, i.e. a node which is both DDS and
CDS.
safe(n, g, d) ≡ dds(n, g, d) ∧ cds(n, g, d)
Finally, we can present the definition of a “valid” graph,
which holds for a graph if all its outputs are safe.
Definition 13 (Graph Validity). An expression graph g is
marked as valid with respect to a policy d if the following is
true:
valid(g, d) ≡ ∀(γ,out) ∈ nodes(g) : safe(nγ , g, d)
We say g is d-valid if valid(g,d).
With the matching mechanism defined, we can present its
theorem of soundness. It states that if a node n in the graph
simulates a node nd in the policy graph, then the set of
expressions possibly held by n is a subset of the set held
by nd in the policy. Once again, proof is omitted.
Theorem 14 (Soundness of the matching mechanism). For
a program’s expression graph g and a policy d, the following
relation holds:
∀n ∈ nodes(g), nd ∈ nodes(d) :
n ∼g,d nd ⇒ expg(n) ⊆ expd(nd)
For the next theorem, we define the notion of a “public”
expression, in terms of a declassification policy. The relation
is defined below.
public(e, d) ≡ (∃nf ∈ fnodes(d) : e ∈ expd(nf )) ∨
(e = f(e1, . . . , en)∧
public(e1, d) ∧ · · · ∧ public(en, d))
With this, we can present the theorem of safety between
process and policy, demonstrating that if the corresponding
graph of a program satisfies a policy, then the expressions on
the process will also satisfy it. This theorem is a consequence
of theorems 9 and 14.
Theorem 15 (Safety between process and policy). For a
program C0, environment pi0 and t a run in Run(C0, pi0),
any configuration 〈C, σ, pi〉 ∈ t, the graph g = G(C0), and a
policy d, the following relations hold:
(i) ∀x ∈ Var : Eσ(x) is defined ∧
dds(nx, g, d)⇒ public(Eσ(x), d)
(ii) ∀γ ∈ Out : Oσ(γ) is defined ∧
dds(nγ , g, d)⇒ ∀e ∈ Oσ(γ) : public(e, d)
(iii) ∀ρ ∈ Var + IO : PC σ(ρ) is defined ∧
cds(nρ, g, d)⇒ ∀e ∈ PC σ(ρ) : public(e, d)
(i) states that if a variable in the program has its corre-
sponding node in the graph (which is guaranteed to exist by
Theorem 9) being data dependency safe, then the expression
held by that variable in the process is safe (i.e. allowed by the
policy); (ii) states that if an output channel in the program has
its corresponding node in the graph being data dependency
safe, then all expressions sent to it in the process are safe;
finally, (iii) states that if a variable or I/O channel has a
corresponding node in the graph being control dependency
safe, then all conditional expressions of the variable (or I/O
channel) in the process are safe.
V. SECURITY PROPERTY
In this section we define our reference security property
called Policy Controlled Release. It is an “end-to-end” property
in the sense that it bounds the knowledge that an attacker can
gain by observing information released on output channels
during any collection of runs. Our property closely follows
the Conditional Gradual Release (CGR) given by Banerjee et
al. [12], though our variant differs from the original definition
in several important respects, being simpler and independent
of characteristics of the program’s execution. CGR itself is
a variant of the Gradual Release [19] property. To simplify
the discussion, we assume that information obtained from all
the input channels is confidential and can be modified only
by the target machine (on which the program runs). Reading
from an input channel is not visible to an outsider. On the
other hand, any information placed on the output channels
is regarded as public. Releasing information from the secret
input channels to the public output channels is permitted only
according to declassification policies. Recall that we have also
assumed that the input channels are non-interactive in the sense
that reading data from one input channel, has no effect on
the values obtained from other input channels. We discuss the
relaxation of these assumptions in Section VIII.
Two environments are said to be d-Equivalent if the values
of the declassifiable expressions are the same in both the
environments. Evaluating the expressions represented by final
nodes in a policy (see V in Section III) gives the actual values
that can be declassified.
Definition 16 (d-Equivalent Environments (≈d)). Given a
declassification policy d, two environments pi1 and pi2 are said
to be d-equivalent, pi1 ≈d pi2, if ∀nf ∈ fnodes(d) .∀e ∈
expd(nf ) . V (e, pi1) = V (e, pi2).
Lemma 17. Given a declassification policy d, two environ-
ments pi1 and pi2, if pi1 ≈d pi2, then for all e ∈ Exp, if
public(e, d), then V (e, pi1) = V (e, pi2).
By observing the value of declassifiable expressions, one
can learn something about the actual environment. In particular
one learns that it must belong to a given class of d-equivalent
environments. The policy d is correctly enforced if no further
information can be learned.
Definition 18 (Revealed Knowledge (R)). Given a declassi-
fication policy d and an environment pi we define R(pi, d) =
{pi′|pi ≈d pi
′}.
Note that the smaller the set R(pi, d) is, the more infor-
mation about pi is permitted to be revealed. The revealed
knowledge represents a bound on the amount of information
that may be revealed by a program that complies with policy d.
The next step is to define the amount of information a program
actually reveals.
The behaviour of a program that an observer can see is
the sequence of outputs it generates. Thus an observer cannot
distinguish two environments if their runs produce the same
sequence of visible output actions.
Definition 19 (Observed Knowledge (K)). Define K(pi,C)
by K(pi,C) = {pi′|Run(C, pi) ≡out Run(C, pi′)}.
Our security property, Policy Controlled Release (PCR),
states that the knowledge obtained from observing the program
is bounded by the information released by the declassification
policies.
Definition 20 (Policy Controlled Release (PCR)). A program
C satisfies policy controlled release for policy d if for all
environments pi : K(pi,C) ⊇ R(pi, d).
VI. SOUNDNESS OF THE ANALYSIS
The following theorem shows that if our analysis says that a
program is secure, then the program satisfies the PCR property.
Theorem 21. For any terminating program C and a declassifi-
cation policy d, if valid(G(C), d) then the program C satisfies
PCR.
Proof: Lemma 24 below implies that the executions of a d-
valid program in two d-equivalent environments can be linked
in a way that guarantees they will result in the same runs.
This implies that for all environments pi,pi′ if pi′ ∈ R(pi, d)
then also pi′ ∈ K(pi,C).
The proof of the theorem relies on a linking between runs,
the existence of which is stated by Lemma 24. First we define
the properties of this linking and the intuition behind how the
linking works and why it must exist. The linking is inspired by
the proof of soundness in Banerjee et al. [12]. However, our
proof is simpler because we do not need to consider the exact
path taken by the program to reach a particular state – our d-
equivalence property together with our flow-sensitive approach
to check validity ensures that both the runs take the same
branches for paths leading to the output actions. Additionally,
the proof is termination-insensitive. This means that for the
proofs to go through, we assume that the loops, in which the
conditional expression is non-declassifiable, terminate.
The core idea behind the linking is that a program can be in
one of two distinct confidentiality levels: a level L (low, pub-
lic) in which it may do output or a level H (high, secret) where
it may behave differently depending on non-declassifiable
information. We say that C is a compositional statement if
C is of the form C1;C2, otherwise C is non-compositional.
Note that any program can be written in the form C1; . . . ;Cn
(n ≥ 1) with Ci non-compositional statements. Here we call
C1 the active command of C, denoted Λ(C). Given a policy
d, we type all non-compositional statements contained in C
as follows:
1) Γ(skip) = H .
2) If Ci is a conditional statement (if or while)
whose condition c is not marked as declassifyable,
i.e. ¬safe((c,var), G(C), d) then Γ(Ci) = H and also
all statements nested inside Ci, directly or indirectly, are
typed H .
3) If Ci is a conditional statement whose condition is de-
classifyable we repeat the procedure for the statement(s)
in the body in the same way.
4) Each non-compositional statement not typed H accord-
ing to the above rules is typed L.
The type of a compositional statement C is the type of its
active command Λ(C). We define the low continuation of C =
C1; . . . ;Cn, denoted L-cont(C) as the statement Ci; . . . ;Cn
where i is the first index for which Ci is not typed high.
In the L level the program will behave ‘the same’ in two
d-equivalent environments. The next definitions capture this
notion of ‘the same’. We first consider the states that a program
could reach.
Definition 22 (Compatible States (≍)). Two states σ1 and
σ2 are said to be compatible for program C and policy d,
denoted σ1 ≍(C,d) σ2, if the following conditions hold:
1) ∀α ∈ In : cds((α,in), G(C), d)⇒ (Iσ1(α) = Iσ2(α)∧
PC σ1(α) = PC σ2(α)).
2) ∀x ∈ Var : cds((x,var), G(C), d) ⇒ (Eσ1(x) =
Eσ2(x) ∧ PC σ1(x) = PC σ2(x)).
If the control dependencies of a variable or channel are
declassifiable then they cannot be altered/read from by the
program in a H level and as L behaviour has to be the same,
they cannot differ between two d-equivalent environments.
Definition 23 (Correspondence between two runs (Q)). Let
C be a program, pi and pi′ be environments, and d be a
policy. Let t be a prerun of Run(C, pi) and t′ be a prerun
of Run(C, pi′) with ‖t‖ = n and ‖t′‖ = m. A correspondence
between t and t′ is a relation Q ⊆ {1, . . . , n} × {1, . . . ,m}
such that 0 Q 0 and for all i, j such that i Q j, letting
ti = 〈oi, 〈Ci, σi, pi〉〉 and t′j = 〈o′j , 〈C ′j , σ′j , pi′〉〉, the following
conditions hold:
1) (output-equivalence) ι(t1 . . . ti) = ι(t′1 . . . t′j)
2) (state-compatibility) σi ≍d σ′j
3) (level-agreement) Γ(Ci) = Γ(C ′j)
4) (code-agreement L) Γ(Ci) = L⇒ Ci = C ′j
5) (code-agreement H) Γ(Ci) = H ⇒ L-cont(Ci) =
L-cont(C ′j)
6) (completeness) ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} : ∃j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} :
i Q j and vice versa
We say two runs correspond if there exists a correspondence
relation between them.
From the first requirement, ‘output-equivalence’, it is clear
that two corresponding runs produce the same output. The
other requirements allow us to inductively build the correspon-
dence relation Q between runs of a program in d-equivalent
environments.
Lemma 24. Given a program C and a declassification policy
d, satisfying valid(G(C), d), and given two environments pi
and pi′ satisfying pi ≈d pi′, such that the program C terminates
under the environments pi and pi′. Let ω = 〈C, σ
init
, pi〉, ω′ =
〈C, σ
init
, pi′〉, and S a (partial) run starting from ω then there
is a partial run T starting from ω′ that corresponds to ω.
Proof: The proof, which we sketch here, inductively
constructs a correspondence relation Q between the two
traces. A relation Q between partial run S of length n and
a corresponding run T can be extended to the partial run
S.〈on, 〈Cn+1, σn+1, pi〉〉 of length n + 1 (if it exists) and an
extension of run T by zero or more steps. When the active
command Λ(Cn) has level L, this is done by a straightforward
case analysis of the active command in the last configuration
in S. When the active command has level H , the two runs
are extended until they both reach commands with level L.
Extending the correspondence is straightforward in these high
regions because the nondeclassifiable nature of the control
context makes output impossible and maintenance of state
compatibility hold trivially.
The key case in the proof handles output statements. In it,
we use the induction hypothesis, together with Theorems 9 and
15, to show that output equivalence is preserved. Because of
the centrality of this, we include here the proof that output
equivalence is preserved in the output case. Assuming that the
final element of S is 〈on, 〈Cn, σn, pi〉〉 and the final element
of T is 〈o′m, 〈C ′m, σ′m, pi〉〉, in this case we have Cn = C ′m =
γ := x;C and Λ(Cn) = γ := x.
Since outputs happen only under declassifiable conditionals,
this case can only occur when safe((x,var), G(C), d),
which means that cds((x,var), G(C), d) and
dds((x,var), G(C), d). From the induction hypothesis,
σn ≍(C ,D) σ
′
m. This combines with cds((x,var), G(C), d)
to give us Eσn(x) = Eσ′m(x). By Theorems 9, we
have Eσn(x) ∈ expG(C)((x,var)). It now follows from
dds((x,var), G(C), d) by using part (i) of Theorem 15
that public(Eσn(x), d). It now follows from pi ≈d pi′ and
Lemma 17 that V (Eσn(x), pi) = V (Eσ′m(x), pi
′). Therefore
the outputs in both these transitions are the same.
VII. RELATED WORK
Many of the initial papers on language based security [1]
enforced the non-interference [2] property statically using
type-based [4], [5], [20] or dataflow-analysis based [6], [7],
[8], [9] approaches. Banaˆtre, et al. [8] were the first to propose
using accessibility graphs to specify data and control flow
dependencies between different variables in the program and
thereby automatically inferring the security properties of the
program. Bergeretti, et al. [21] represent information flows as
relations between different variables in the program and Clark,
et al. [22] represent flows as relations between the variables
and the control flow points represented by the program counter.
Although the above approaches require dependency calcula-
tion similar to our expression graphs, we can additionally
represent declassification policies, while they can only check
for pure non-interference. More recently, Hammer, et al. [23],
[24] propose an information flow control algorithm for Java.
The variable dependencies are specified in the form of depen-
dency graphs. The declassification policies are specified using
path conditions, which are a conjunction of all the conditional
expressions that are encountered before reaching the output
program point. Although the path conditions are certainly
useful to specify some kind of declassification policies, they
do not compute what expressions are being declassified. Here,
we attempt to capture this information using our expression
graphs. Swamy, et al. [25] propose a formal language, AIR
(Automata for Information Release), for describing stateful
information release policies separately from the program that
is to be secured. Although the policies are specified in the
form of an automaton separate from the program, the approach
requires that the programs be written in λAIR, a core formal-
ism for a functional programming language, so that the AIR
policies can be provably enforced.
In type-based approaches the declassification condition is
tagged to the security lattice [26], [27], [28], [29] or to
an expression inside the program [30]. Since declassification
typically involves downgrading the security level from high
to low, this is the right place to specify the policies. To
specify which policy to use at the declassification points,
new syntactic constructs are introduced into the programming
language, making the policy and the program to be inter-
dependent on each other. In most cases, a new declass
command is introduced into the program. The enforcement
is usually a hybrid of static analysis and dynamic execution.
In some approaches [31], [32], a particular section of code
is encapsulated in a conditional statement. The condition
specifies the declassification policy. This section of code is
executed only if the condition is true, thereby dynamically
enforcing declassification. More recently, some approaches
advocate specifying a special security API [13], [25], [33]. If
the program is written using this API, declassification policies
can be provably enforced.
Li and Zdancewic [26] use declassification policies that take
the form of lambda terms over inputs, akin to our approach.
Expressing the policies in lambda calculus gives them the
flexibility to compare different policy terms for equivalence.
This is a strength of the prior work in relation to our own.
The main strength of our work in relation to theirs lies in our
enforcement mechanism. For this, they use a type system that
labels each variable in the program with a security policy.
The security lattice is given over the lambda terms in the
policy. As they also point out, their enforcement mechanism
cannot handle policies such as λx : int.λp : int.(x + p) ∗ p.
On the other hand, our work handles this kind of situation,
since our program expression graphs implicitly keep track
of all the expressions that can flow to an output channel,
enabling our approach to analyze expressions resulting from
global computations. Thus, using program graphs allows us
to enforce more expressive policies. The paper also hints that
that their approach can be applied to untrusted code if enforced
differently, but does not explain how to do so.
The type-based enforcement mechanism of delimited re-
lease [30] and localized delimited release [34] policies keep
track of the variables involved the in the declassified expres-
sions and ensure that they are not updated before declassifi-
cation. This is required to prevent laundering of information.
Our flow based enforcement automatically keeps track of the
changes in the variables, thereby precluding the need to have
an explicit declassification construct in the program.
Jif [35] is one of the most advanced programming languages
designed to enforce fine-grained declassification policies in
the program. However, if the programs and policy are not
carefully designed, as stated in [13], there is a risk of burying
the policy deep inside the code and therefore requiring a
change in the program with every change in the policy. In
light of this observation, several researchers studied how large
programs can be written in a security typed language so
that their behaviour is provably secure. Askarov, et al. [36]
show how security typed languages can be used to implement
cryptographic protocols and propose several design patterns
to help the programmers to write their applications in Jif.
They program a large poker application to demonstrate their
approach. Hicks, et al. [13] propose FJifP, which includes all
the security features of Jif and also an option to use certain
methods as declassifiers. They also highlight the need for
effective programming tools in which to write Jif programs.
Askarov, et al. [19] provided the foundation for CGR with
their definition of the Gradual Release (GR) property. Their
paper quantifies the knowledge obtained by the observer as
the set of possible secret inputs that could be generated by ob-
serving the public outputs, i.e., the notion of observed knowl-
edge. The GR property states that the observer’s knowledge
increases only at declassification points. Our aim of supporting
policies that are as program-independent as possible prevents
our considering attacker models that involve program variables
other than output channels. Thus the observed knowledge in
our framework is the knowledge obtained from the outputs
and does not depend on any other program events. The CGR
property of [12] requires the GR property. Additionally, it
requires that the low-security observer of program behavior
is able to detect no difference between runs that are generated
from initial states that yield the same values for expressions
identified in the declassification policies. Our formulations of
revealed and observed knowledge follow a similar approach.
Banerjee, et al. [12] achieve separation of code and declas-
sification policies. However, their approach does not achieve
complete separation of code and policy. The flowspecs are
a combination of a formula over program variables (P ),
special predicates called the agreement predicates (ϕ) over the
program variables and a modifiable variable (x) whose type is
being changed. The flowspecs are quite expressive and can be
used to specify policies in when, where and what dimensions.
However the technique only works for trusted code, which is
written according to the policy specification. In their paper,
if P and ϕ only have global variables, then they say that x
can be a schematic variable instantiated with different local
variables. Although this allows them to have more flexibility
in terms of applying the same policy to different parts of a
large code base, it does not allow them to use the policies for
entirely different programs. The policies cannot be reused for
any other code in which the data structures and global variable
names differ. Our policy specifications are more general and
can be applied to multiple, unrelated programs.
The notion of indistinguishability used in [37] is closely
related to our D-equivalence relation, as it is based on the
attackers’ knowledge of the initial values of high variables
in their escape hatches, which resemble the declassifiable
expressions identified by policy in our framework. However,
their expressions are identified individually, which prevents
them declassifying expressions of unbounded size, such as
result from iterative computations. They also do not share our
objective of completely separating policy from program. This
enables them to consider where declassification occurs within
the program, and to handle attacker models in which non-
output events are observable, which we inherently cannot do.
Giambiagi and Dam [38] provide a framework for analyzing
a security protocol’s implementation against its specification.
A dependency specification defines an information flow prop-
erty by characterizing the direct flow along a path in the
form of allowed sequence of API and primitive function calls.
However, as the authors mention in the paper, dependency
specifications are very low-level objects, which can be used as
intermediate representations of flow requirements. In general,
their dependency specifications should accurately capture the
exact number of times a method is called during a particular
flow and it can only characterize a single flow. By contrast,
our expression graph representation can represent several flow
patterns, including loops.
Taint analysis [39], [40] considers direct data flows, but,
unlike information flow analysis, ignores control flows. In this
sense, it is much less demanding than declassification-policy
enforcement.
Giacobazzi and Mastroeni [41] provide a powerful frame-
work in which to specify the weakened variant of non-
interference that is enforced under a declassification policy.
We think its likely that our Policy Controlled Release property
could be precisely stated in their framework, modulo the
fact that our approach is communication channel-oriented,
while theirs focuses on state transformation. We view our
contribution as bringing the field closer to being able to
implement a large class of practical analyses that can be
specified in their framework. This prior work is highly abstract,
and provides little guidance with respect to the construction
of usable analysis tools.
VIII. DISCUSSION
Our approach to policy specification and enforcement
achieves a clean separation of code and policy. Because of
this separation, the system operator has the ability to select
different policies for different situations/uses, and to determine
through the use of our analysis whether a given program
is appropriate for each use. An additional advantage of our
framework is the ability to handle declassification policies
depending on recursive structures such as loops.
We have identified two issues that remain to be addressed.
First, as illustrated in the discussion at the end of Section II,
one would like to be able to express requirements regarding
the number of times a loop runs before declassifying the
resulting value, for instance, to ensure that enough values
are being averaged. We believe that a full treatment of the
problem of how many times a loop runs can be achieved via a
cooperation between static analysis and runtime enforcement
mechanisms, with the former specifying the constraint and the
latter enforcing it. Secondly, this paper does not address the
problem of matching program graphs against policy graphs up
to algebraic equivalence of the denoted expressions [42]. This
would enable verification of programs that compute expres-
sions that differ from those identified by the declassification
policy, but that are equivalent to them under algebraic laws,
such as associativity, commutativity, and idempotence. One
possible approach to this would be to transform program
and policy graphs into a normal form and then apply the
matching we propose here. Of course, in general, this can
lead to a combinatorial explosion, and some conservative
approximation may be necessary to retain tractability.
Our flow-analysis is termination-insensitive [43]. We can
make the analysis termination-sensitive either by disallowing
while loops under high conditionals or introducing a flow
between the conditional in which the loop is declared to
all the output channels in the program. However, both these
approaches are too restrictive. Disallowing the while loops
under high conditionals would also make the program depen-
dent on the policy, which we want to avoid. Achieving the
right balance between handling termination behavior correctly
versus ensuring that the analysis is practical is tough and it is
out of the scope of the current paper. In this paper, therefore,
we do not deal with termination and timing channels.
The policies used by our framework specify the expressions
over inputs that can be declassified, so they address the
what dimension of declassification. It is straightforward to
extend our analysis to address the who dimension, as the
system operator can control which policy graphs are used
in analyzing the program based on who wrote the program
and the policies, and who is going to observe the outputs
from the output channels. On the other hand, utilizing the
where dimension extensively would be contrary to our goal of
making the policy program-independent. In the case of legacy
code, the programs are typically written without information-
flow policies explicitly defined. For untrusted code, we have
sought an approach that provides assurance without requiring
to trust the programmer. Nevertheless, for cases in which the
where dimension is required, it is straightforward to specify
program points at which a particular policy may be applied
by associating this condition with the policy itself; no code-
annotations are required. The when dimension may entail that
some part of the program be verified with one policy, and other
parts be verified with another, based on a condition that might
occur during the execution of the program. Specifying such
policies require intimate knowledge of the program and might
be possible for trusted code which is being newly written. For
legacy and untrusted code, it is unrealistic to specify such a
dimension.
One premise of our work is that declassifications are not
invertible. This assumption is realistic since we consider well-
formed policies. If a declassification policy allows a f(α),
in the scenario where a f−1 function exists, then the policy
is actually allowing α to be disclosed. Even if we had
some mechanism that checks if a given function had not
been inverted throughout the code, nothing would prevent the
inverse function from being applied outside of the program.
Therefore, we assume that well-formed policies do not allow
invertible expressions to be declassified.
Sections V and VI assume that all output channels in the
program are observable. We also assume that all the input
channels are controlled by the target system. To weaken these
requirements, we can associate security levels to inputs and
outputs, and specify allowed flows by using standard lattice
models. The labels on policy graph nodes would be extended
accordingly, and the analysis algorithm would be required to
respect these labels. This would result in very little change to
our approach or in the PCR theorem and its proof.
If the input channels used in the program are interactive,
the values of the inputs can change outside the program
control. As a result, accessing one input channel may influence
the value of another input channel. Such interactions are
not considered in our current threat model. However, they
can be treated by including additional assumptions about the
interactions between the channels. For example, if a collection
of input channels is under an attacker’s control, they are
somewhat equivalent to each other, thus requiring that all such
channels share the same collection of control dependencies.
Thus, if any of them is read in a non-declassifiable context,
no value read from any of these channels may be declassified.
A similar reasoning applies if reads themselves are observable
events. We plan to address these issues in future work.
Our approach can also be extended to support a broader
range of language constructs. Since we rely on φ-functions
from SSA translation to recognize control-flow branches,
commands like case, continue, break and others can
be included in our mechanism in a straightforward manner,
provided there is a valid translation of them to SSA form.
For constructs such as procedures, methods, classes and in-
heritance, our approach can be adapted to work in a modular
way [44]. Individual blocks of code, such as user defined
functions, can be analyzed by generating separate graphs,
and calls to these blocks would use “procedure call edges”
to reference “argument nodes”. Global variables (and class
parameters), however, would need special treatment. As with
most language-based information flow techniques, extending
our approach to allow concurrency and constructs that enable
control flow to jump to unpredictable points of the code (e.g.,
computed goto, exceptions) pose bigger challenges.
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